Public, permissionless blockchains are dependent for their security and reliability on their economic incentives and mechanism design. Some private, permissioned ones may be as well.
This conference will explore the economic security aspects of blockchain protocols, including game theory, incentive design, mechanism design and market design along with other topics related to crypto-economics security, and to foster collaborations among researchers and practitioners working on these topics.
Call for Papers
Submission instructions: Submissions can be full papers, work-in-progress, one-page summaries or presentation slides. Please make sure that the submission provides sufficient detail to explain what the talk will be about. Papers or presentations may be previously presented or published.
Submissions should be technical in nature, but including considerations of the legal, policy, and ethical implications of results is appreciated.
*The conference does not publish proceedings.
Previous Speakers and topics:
- Zerocash: Addressing Bitcoin's privacy problem by Alessandro Chiesa
- Proofs-of-delay and randomness beacons in Ethereum by Benedikt Bünz
- On Space-Scare Economy In Blockchain System by Dmitry Meshkov
- A scalable verification solution for blockchains by Jason Teutsch
- Scalable and Efficient Distributed Ledgers by Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias
- Price Manipulation in the Bitcoin Ecosystem by Neil Gandal
- Scalable Bias-Resistant Distributed Randomness by Philipp Jovanovic
- A Smart Contract for Boardroom Voting with Maximum Voter Privacy by Patrick McCorry
- On Power Splitting Games in Distributed Computation by Ratul Saha
- On the Necessity of a Prescribed Block Validity Consensus: Analyzing Bitcoin Unlimited Mining Protocol by Ren Zhang
- Keepers - Workers that Maintain Blockchain Networks By Ryan Zurrer
- What is a token? – A transaction cost economics approach to the foundations of cryptoeconomics by Sinclair Davidson
- Escrow Protocols for Cryptocurrencies by Steven Goldfeder
- Tortoise & Hares Consensus: the Meshcash Framework for Incentive-Compatible, Scalable Cryptocurrencies by Tal Moran
- Cryptoeconomics in Casper by Vlad Zamfir
- Bitcoin Mining Pools: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis By Yoad Lewenberg